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Paragon or Pariah? The Consequences of Being Conspicuously Rich in 
China’s New Economy 
 
Abstract 
 China’s headlong rush into economic modernity has resulted in a new breed of very 
wealthy business people. In some cultures, wealth or the creation of wealth is lauded 
whereas in other cultures, vast wealth is viewed with suspicion and contempt. We argue 
that people in China, with its two thousand-year old Confucian ideology and its more recent 
experience of socialism, are more likely to react negatively to reports of conspicuous 
wealth. To test our arguments, we examine the reactions to and consequences of being 
included on the Hurun Rich List, an annual listing of the 100 richest business people in 
China. We find negative consequences to being on the Hurun Rich List: stock prices decline, 
government subsidies are reduced, and the named business people are more likely to be 
investigated, arrested, and charged by the authorities. Moreover, the listed entrepreneurs are 
more likely to conceal profits through negative earnings management after being listed. 
These effects are strongest in rent-seeking industries and when the entrepreneur or firm 
does not have a particularly favorable image. This is consistent with the fairness concept 
that suggests that the rich who benefit from political connections or rent-seeking are treated 
differently than those who rely on talent and innovation. 
 
Keywords: Egalitarianism; Fairness; Market reaction; Legal risk; Rent seeking 
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 Paragon or Pariah? The Consequences of Being Conspicuously Rich in 
China’s New Economy 
 
1. Introduction 
Most economic models are built on the assumption that all people are exclusively 
motivated by their material self-interest. A consequence of this is that a person’s status or 
importance in society can be captured by their wealth. One radical departure from these 
models argues that the utility function of an individual includes some measure of fairness in 
income distribution. Alesina et al. (2004) find that inequality negatively affects individual 
utility even after controlling for individual income. Psychologists document that most 
individuals feel a strong need to believe that they live in a world that is fair. This concept of 
fairness in socio-economics is introduced in Alesina and Angeletos (2005). The concept 
holds that people should get what they deserve, and deserve what they get. It is supported 
by a variety of experimental and empirical evidence that shows that people are more 
willing to accept inequality of outcomes generated by what is perceived as effort or ability 
than inequality that is the outcome of luck, connections, or corruptions. This paper tests 
empirically how fairness shapes people’s perception on inequality in China by studying the 
reaction of investors and governments to the publication of the Hurun Rich List,
1
 an annual 
listing of China’s 100 richest business people. 
                                                        
1
 The Hurun Report was established in 1999 by Rupert Hoogewerf, the ‘godfather’ of the China Rich 
List. Today, the Hurun Report is widely recognized as the foremost authority in tracking the rapid 
changes of wealth among China’s high net worth individuals. Hoogewerf was awarded New Weekly 
magazine's prestigious Person of the Year award in 2002 for his contribution to the understanding of 
wealth in China. In 2004, he was named one of the “100 Top Influencers” in China’s Globalization by 
Global Entrepreneur magazine. On 8 September 2009, the Shanghai government presented Hoogewerf 
with the Magnolia Award, for his contribution to the development of the Shanghai economy. 
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We begin our investigation by looking at how investors react to the event of 
entrepreneurs being included in the annual Hurun Rich List. We find that, when the Rich 
List is announced, investors react negatively to the companies controlled by the listed 
entrepreneurs (where ‘listed’ means being named on the Rich List). The mean cumulative 
abnormal stock return (CAR) of the affiliated firms is -1.83% around the event window 
[-10, 10 days]. In addition to the short-term returns, we also estimate the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHAR) for 12 months, 24 months, and 36 months. We find that 
BHAR-12, BHAR-24, and BHAR-36 are -7.92%, -15.36%, and -18.53%, respectively.  
The Chinese government has good reason to be mindful of public perception given its 
well-known fear of being overthrown in some form of social uprising. The government 
promotes the ideal of a harmonious society to ease social anger over the growing income 
inequalities and increasing cases of corruption that have accompanied the country’s 
economic reforms. In light of this, we examine whether the government is less likely to 
assist the entrepreneurs included in the Rich List, whether it monitors them more closely, 
and whether it becomes less tolerant of the “original sin” of being rich. We find that 
affiliated companies receive less government subsidies after the names of their ultimate 
controlling shareholders are published in the list. In addition, we find that the listed 
entrepreneurs are far more likely to be investigated, arrested and charged, compared with 
other private entrepreneurs in China. Moreover, we find that the listed entrepreneurs are 
more likely to conceal profits through negative earnings management after being listed. 
We examine whether cross-sectional variations exist in the economic consequences of 
being included in the Hurun Rich List. According to an online opinion poll in 2010 by the 
People’s Daily, 91% of the population holds the view that the rich benefit from political 
connections, while only 16% think being rich has something to do with merit (Anderlini, 
2010). The majority of ordinary Chinese people believe that official corruption and 
nepotism play key roles in making many business people exceptionally rich. A typical case 
is that of an entrepreneur building political connections or bribing officials to gain entry to 
a regulated industry, such as mining, public utilities, real estate, or the financial industry. 
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Huge profits can be gained in these industries. We find that the economic consequences of 
being included in the Rich List are more negative for entrepreneurs involved in these 
rent-seeking industries. However, we find that the negative consequences of appearing in 
the Rich List are mitigated if the named entrepreneurs share their wealth by making 
substantial donations to charitable causes. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the paper 
contributes to the research on fairness initiated by Alesina and Angeletos (2005). They find 
that in the U.S., wealth and success are perceived as outcomes of individual talent, effort, 
and entrepreneurship, whereas in Europe larger roles are attributed to luck, corruption, and 
political connection. Furthermore, experimental and empirical findings show that people 
are more willing to accept inequality when the outcomes are perceived to be generated by 
effort or ability (the entrepreneurs are paragons of virtue) rather than luck or connections 
(the entrepreneurs are pariahs). Our finding that investors and the government react more 
negatively towards firms that are perceived to be owned by corrupt wealthy individuals 
lends support to this concept of fairness.  
Second, our study expands the research on the effect of philanthropy (e.g., Navarro, 
1988; William and Barrett, 2000; Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Wang and Qian, 2011). Wang 
and Qian (2011) find that corporate philanthropy is positively associated with firm financial 
performance in China. They argue that corporate philanthropy helps firms gain 
socio-political legitimacy, which enables them to earn positive shareholder responses. Our 
findings provide complementary evidence by showing that the firms controlled by Rich List 
entrepreneurs who give more charitable donations tend to experience less negative 
consequences. 
Third, our paper adds to the research on the impact of culture, social norms, customs 
and religion on economic behavior (e.g., Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Guiso et al., 2006, 
2008, 2009; Hong and Kacperzyk, 2009). Based on China’s unique culture and socialist 
history, we provide new empirical evidence to support the argument that social norms (in 
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particular, Confucian ideology and socialist principles inculcated by the controlling 
Communist Party) play an important role in shaping economic behavior. 
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the egalitarian 
culture in China and develop our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the 
sample, and section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Prior Research and Hypotheses Development 
The concept of fairness is deeply rooted in Confucianism which is the basic system of 
belief in China and other countries in East and Southeast Asia. Unlike most Western 
countries, China does not have a dominant religion. However, the Confucian ideology has 
had a great influence in shaping China’s social values and institutions (Allen et al., 2005). 
For thousands of years, classical Confucian texts, such as The Four Books and The Five 
Classics, have served as the “Bibles” of the educated class in China. Many of the basic 
values of Confucianism underpin the beliefs of ordinary people and over time have 
imperceptibly evolved into general social norms. Although, in very recent times, China has 
been increasingly influenced by foreign cultures, the Confucian ideology still remains at the 
core of the value system of the general public (Ralston et al., 1993; Ralston et al., 1999). 
Moreover, unlike in Western countries, the legal environment in China is relatively weak. 
Instead, Confucian values play a number of critical legal roles and, to a large extent, serve 
as the basis of China’s legal environment (Greif and Tabellini, 2010).  
One of the core concepts in Confucian culture is “The Doctrine of the Mean”. Rather 
than advocating individual responsibility, this doctrine focuses on the collective will, or 
collectivism, which in economic terms means egalitarianism. As early as China’s Spring 
and Autumn Period,
2
 Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, proposed that the main 
                                                        
2
 The Spring and Autumn Period is a period in Chinese history that roughly corresponds to the first half 
of the Eastern Zhou dynasty (from the second half of the 8
th
 century B.C. to the first half of the 5
th
 
century B.C.). The name comes from the Spring and Autumn Annals, a chronicle of the state of Lu 
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economic concern is not “scarcity, but uneven distribution”. This principal has had a 
profound impact on Chinese and East Asian cultures, where the general public continues to 
believe in the need to “even out the circumstances of the poor and the rich”, and are 
reluctant to accept very uneven distributions of wealth caused by individual differences in 
endowments. In fact, the egalitarian nature of Confucianism is also an important reason 
why Communism and Socialism have been readily accepted at the grass roots level. After 
China implemented its socialist system in 1949, the public’s consciousness of 
egalitarianism was further strengthened.  
The Communist Party saw capitalism as being based on the exploitation of workers. 
The communist ideologies include establishing a classless society, the removal of economic 
inequality among people, abolishing private ownership, and enabling the “full realization of 
human capital”. As a consequence of living under a more than fifty-year socialist political 
rule, people generally hold negative attitudes toward the rich because they view wealth as 
the outcome of the exploitation of labor. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) use the 
separation and reunification of Germany as a natural experiment to examine how 
Communism affects preferences. They find that those who lived in the former East 
Germany more strongly prefer redistribution after reunification. For more than thirty years, 
China has been moving toward a fully fledged market-based economy. The rapid 
development of the Chinese economy has led to a more favorable public perception of the 
need for incentives and wealth creation (Djankov et al., 2006a, b). However, the rank and 
file of the ordinary people is still heavily influenced by the “egalitarian” legacy of the old 
socialist days and the enduring appeal of Confucianism. 
The concept of social class within the Confucian culture has always been critical of 
businessmen. As an old saying goes, “all business people are profiteers” and this remains 
the general impression that the public holds of business people. The economic policy of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
between 722 and 479 B.C., which is traditionally associated with Confucius. The period itself lasted 
from 770 to 476 B.C.  
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“laying stress on agriculture and restraining trade” has been instituted numerous times in 
Chinese history. In short, egalitarian culture is deeply rooted in the minds and souls of the 
general public.  
The “hidden rich” is a relatively normal phenomenon among wealthy Chinese people 
due to these egalitarian values. The rich are reluctant to disclose their wealth to the public 
and fear that it will cause social resentment. In contrast, business people in some other 
countries are not ashamed to advertise their wealth and some of them cultivate a distinct 
celebrity image. Indeed, some people are offended if they do not appear high up in the 
rankings of the rich.
3
 In some societies, rich people, especially the first or second 
generation of being rich, are upheld as role models and as paragons of hard work, ingenuity, 
and business acumen that has helped society at large. 
China’s wealthy are newly minted. The general public had little knowledge about 
extreme wealth in China before the publication of the Hurun Rich List, which has enabled 
the public to become better acquainted with Chinese billionaires as a group.
4
 In addition to 
disclosing the names of Chinese billionaires and ranking their wealth, the Rich List also 
publishes information related to the major companies controlled by the billionaires and the 
industries the companies are involved in. The list also includes personal details of the 
wealthy, such as their age, birth place and educational background. As a result, the list has 
become an important information source for the public to gain insights into the wealthy 
class and how they built their fortunes.  
Influenced by an egalitarian culture, the public in China are fascinated by the lifestyles 
of billionaires and apply higher moral standards to their behavior. Chinese entrepreneurs 
                                                        
3
 In 2013, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Alsaud of Saudi Arabia complained publicly about his ‘low’ 
ranking in Forbes Magazine’s list of richest billionaires. Forbes’ estimate of his net worth was $20 
billion while he claims it was $30 billion. His complaints were made to the media at large and were 
widely reported. 
4
 The Hurun Rich List was originally compiled in collaboration with Forbes. It started its own 
independent operation in 2004 and has since become the most well-known Rich List in China. 
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accumulated their wealth during China’s transition from a centrally-planned to a market 
driven economy. There is a widespread belief that these entrepreneurs and their companies 
must have committed many “original sins” just like their counterparts in the West did a 
century ago (Watkins, 1907; Josephson, 1962; Rockoff, 2008). Furthermore, as the rich 
become richer, serious resentment against them is developing. Specifically, the media are 
more inclined to dig out and report negative news about wealthy entrepreneurs and their 
companies (Hong, 2004). Redemption stories, such as those about philanthropy, are in 
relatively short supply. The growing anger of the public at what they see as undeserved 
wealth accumulation has forced the government to monitor those on the Rich List more 
closely.  
The above mentioned responses of the public, media, and government have placed the 
entrepreneurs included on the Rich List and their companies under a rather unfavorable 
social microscope. Given China’s cultural heritage, allied to its recent inculcation of 
socialist principles, we believe investors are likely to regard inclusion on the Rich List as 
negative news. Therefore, we expect that investors will react negatively to the affiliated 
companies when the list is announced. This effect is expected to be long-standing.  
The decentralization of the Chinese economy in recent decades has resulted in 
competition between local governments (Qian and Weingast, 1997). This 
inter-jurisdictional competition provides incentives for regional governments to compete in 
reforms to boost local economic growth and employment. In addition, the career paths of 
regional government officials are linked with regional economic performance, which is 
reflected in indicators such as the GDP growth rate (Li and Zhou, 2005). The development 
of the private sector has become one of the main drivers of inter-jurisdictional competition 
among local governments. Local officials have strong career incentives to offer policies to 
support the private sector. Government subsidies have become a feasible and effective way 
for local governments to exert influence over firms. The extent of the subsidies given to a 
firm depends in part on the political connections of its owner. Furthermore, the granting of 
subsidies may depend on kickbacks and other types of bribery and corruption. In order to 
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allay the public’s fear that the rich business people have benefitted from the largesse of 
government grants and subsidies, the local government may reduce the level of subsidies 
given to firms affiliated with entrepreneurs if and when the entrepreneurs appear on the 
Rich List. Here, the authorities seek to avoid the appearance of favoritism towards the rich. 
Furthermore, as the media are more inclined to dig out and report negative news about 
wealthy entrepreneurs and their companies, local officials may relent under this pressure 
and monitor the named Rich List entrepreneurs more closely and enforce government 
regulations against them more strictly. This suggests that the authorities may single out 
Rich List business people for investigation of economic crimes. Thus, we expect that those 
people appearing on the Rich List will be more likely to be investigated, arrested, and 
charged by the government, regardless of the merits of the case. This will inevitably have 
negative carry over effects to the listed firms they control. Therefore, we expect that, after 
the publication of the Hurun Rich List, the affiliated companies will be less likely to receive 
government subsidies, and those on the list will be far more likely to be investigated, 
arrested and charged by the government for economic crimes. One response of an 
entrepreneur to the adverse publicity associated with appearing on the Rich List is to engage 
in earnings management in the companies they control whereby the reported profitability is 
reduced. 
In principle, there are two kinds of inequality, justifiable inequality and unjustifiable 
inequality. Justifiable inequality is induced by variation in talent and effort, while 
unjustifiable inequality is induced by variation in corruption and rent seeking. Alesina and 
Angeletos (2005) show that people are more willing to accept inequality when the 
outcomes are perceived to have been generated by hard work or effort, rather than by luck 
or connections or corruption. While it is difficult for the public to distinguish between 
entrepreneurs with talent, creativity, and hard work and those who rely on patronage, 
political connections, and corruption, we believe the latter tend to work in regulated (or 
rent-seeking) industries. Here, the privatized industries are sold to, or placed in the hands of, 
politically connected business people. The government tends to ensure these industries are 
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profitable and so the business people’s investments in the firms can grow to large fortunes. 
We would expect that investors are more resentful towards wealthy entrepreneurs who 
make their fortunes in rent-seeking industries.  
Wealthy entrepreneurs can engage in strategic philanthropy, which negates or at least 
helps reduce any negative public image they may have incurred from being conspicuously 
rich. The goodwill created by individual involvement in charitable causes can enhance the 
image, reputation, and customer loyalty of the firms they control, and lead to more lenient 
treatment by regulators or government officials. Navarro (1988) shows that corporate 
contributions represent a form of advertising, as firms that spend more on advertising also 
tend to give more to charity. Increasing charitable contributions can increase the value of 
the giver’s moral capital. William and Barrett (2000) find that the decline in reputation 
associated with criminal activity is reduced for those firms more heavily involved in 
corporate philanthropy. An individual’s or a firm’s investments in philanthropy can help to 
maintain valuable goodwill that offsets or ameliorates negative publicity (Barnett and 
Salomon, 2006). This is especially likely for these Rich List entrepreneurs in an 
environment of resentment against the rich. We would expect that investors and the 
government tend to react less negatively towards those firms that engage in strategic 
philanthropy to enhance their reputation and image.  
 
3. Data and Sample 
We use the listed companies controlled by the top 100 entrepreneurs on the annual 
Hurun Rich List,
5
 for each year from 1999 to 2009, as our initial sample. In the cases 
where an entrepreneur is on the list for many years, we regard his or her first-time listing as 
                                                        
5
 The Hurun Report was established in 1999. It is the first and the most influential rank for billionaires 
in China. There were 50 billionaires on the list in 1999 and 2000. The number gradually increased to 100 
from 2001 to 2004, 400, 500 and 800 from 2005 to 2007 and finally reached 1000 in 2008 and 2009. We 
include the top 100 billionaires in our analyses. We obtain the similar results when we focus our sample 
on the top 50 billionaires.  
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the event year. The names of the companies directly or indirectly controlled by the 
entrepreneurs are hand collected by comparing the ultimate shareholder data disclosed in 
the annual report and the names on the Rich List. In addition, financial and stock price data 
of the companies listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China are 
collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.  
Initially, we identify 114 companies directly or indirectly controlled by the top 100 
entrepreneurs included in the Rich List. We apply the following process to refine our 
sample. First, we exclude 11 companies with insufficient financial information on the PRE- 
and POST- Listed periods in the CSMAR database. Next, we exclude 4 companies with 
insufficient or missing return data during the event period.
6
 Finally, we drop 2 firms in the 
financial industry. Our final sample consists of 97 companies. The major shareholders of 
these firms are individuals. To reduce the effect of potential outliers, we winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. Panel A of Table 1 illustrates our sample 
selection process. Panel B reports the distribution of the sample by year. It shows that the 
number of firms is evenly distributed over time except for 2001 and 2003 when there are 
more entrepreneurs and their firms appearing on the Hurun Rich List for the first time.
7
  
****************** 
Insert Table 1 here 
****************** 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Market Reaction to the Announcement of the Rich List 
We investigate investors’ reactions to the publication of the Rich List by looking at the 
stock price changes of the companies controlled by the listed billionaires during the period 
                                                        
6
 We require that companies must have return data during the event period and for at least 90 of 200 
trading days during the estimation period. 
7
 There are more firms appearing in these years because the number of Rich List entrepreneurs is 
expanded from 50 to 100 billionaires over the period 2001 to 2004. 
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when the Rich List is published. To be specific, we set the first day following the 
announcement of the Rich List as the event date (day 0),
8
 and calculate abnormal returns 
(AR) around the event date using the standard market model. The market return is the 
value-weighted index of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and the estimation 
period is 200 days before day -10 (i.e., day -210 to day -11).  
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the CARs. We find that the mean 
CARs for the treatment sample are significantly negative at -0.585% (window -1, 1), 
-0.772% (-2, 2), and -1.825% (-10, 10), respectively. See Figure 1. The parametric t-test 
preliminary supports our prediction that the CARs for the treatment sample are negative. 
This indicates that investors regard entrepreneurs being included on the Rich List as bad 
news. Nonetheless, these results do not control for cross-correlation among residuals 
resulting from event date clustering and thus should be interpreted with caution. 
As we have a common event date for each year, we also test for a significant market 
reaction using Schipper and Thompson (1983) procedures that control for cross-sectional 
dependence in residuals. Specifically, we estimate the following Model (1) by ordinary 
least squares:  
, ,p t m t k k tR R Event                                            (1) 
In the above model, Rp equals the daily return to an equally-weighted portfolio of the 
treatment sample. Rm is the daily market return (we proxy return by the value-weighted 
index of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges). Eventk is a dummy variable equal 
to one for the days in the three event windows, and zero for all other days in the estimation 
period. The estimation period runs from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2009, including 
2,654 trading days. The coefficient δk represents the “shift in mean excess return” 
associated with the event (Schipper and Thompson, 1983). 
                                                        
8
 We select the first day following the announcement of the Rich List as the event date because the 
major newspapers in China usually report the Rich List on that day. As a sensitivity test, we also redo our 
analyses with the announcement day as the event date. The results are qualitatively the same. 
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Panel B reports the Schipper and Thompson (1983) regression results. We find a 
significantly negative event-day effect for the treatment sample over windows (-1, 1) and 
(-10, 10), with t-statistics of -2.27 and -3.83, respectively. Thus, the significantly negative 
market reaction to the announcement of the Rich List is robust to a control for 
cross-correlation among residuals. This negative market reaction is predicated on the belief 
that a listing in the Rich List report will generate negative goodwill in the minds of the 
population and investors may shun the affiliated stock and customers may disappear 
leading to a loss of market share. Furthermore, the firms will receive less favor from the 
government and law enforcement will be tightened against the listed entrepreneurs. 
In addition to the short-term returns, we also estimate the BHARs for 12 months, 24 
months, and 36 months. The results are reported in Panel C of Table 2. We find that 
BHAR-12, BHAR-24, and BHAR-36 are -7.92%, -15.36%, and -18.53%, respectively. 
Thus, firms that are controlled by entrepreneurs who appear on the Rich List suffer long 
term underperformance in the stock market.  
****************** 
Insert Table 2 here 
****************** 
 
4.2 Differences-in-Differences Propensity Score Matching Methodology 
We use a differences-in-differences propensity score matching (DID-PSM) approach 
to identify the dimensions of the economic consequences of being on the Rich List by 
comparing inter-temporal differences for the treatment (controlled by listed entrepreneurs) 
and the control (controlled by non-listed entrepreneurs) samples (Blundell and Costa Dias, 
2000; Görg and Strobl, 2007).
9
 On the one hand, this design allows us to mitigate selection 
bias due to observables imposing a linear relation between the observables (i.e., covariates) 
                                                        
9
 As argued by Blundell and Costa Dias (2000), a combination of the propensity score matching with the 
difference-in-differences analysis is likely to improve considerably the accuracy of an evaluation study. 
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and the outcomes of interest
10
, and, on the other hand, we can control for common trends of 
macro variables on both groups. 
Specifically, our DID-PSM design is implemented in the following steps. First, for 
each company controlled by the Rich List entrepreneurs in our sample period, we identify 
the first year the entrepreneur appears on Rich List (year T, the listing year). We then select 
all observations for each company in the three years prior to the listing year (i.e., years T-1, 
T-2, and T-3), which comprise our PRE-Listed sub-sample, and select all available 
observations for the three years subsequent to the listing year for each company which 
comprise our POST-Listed sub-sample.
11
 The choice of a 3-year window for the 
PRE-Listed and POST-Listed periods is somewhat arbitrary and reflects a tradeoff between 
selecting a window long enough to measure the implications of being included on the Rich 
List, yet short enough to avoid picking up other potential economic events common to all 
sample companies. 
We utilize a control sample to help ensure that any inter-temporal change in long-term 
market performance, government subsidy, entrepreneurs’ legal risk, and earnings 
management that we document for the treatment sample are not common to all companies 
over the sample period. To identify the control sample, we use a PSM procedure 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Armstrong et al., 2010; McInnis and Collins, 2011). For 
each listing year in our treatment sample, we select a matching company (controlled by a 
non-listed entrepreneur) in the same year and industry that has the closest propensity score. 
The propensity-score is the predicted value from a logit model of the probability that a 
company’s ultimate shareholder will be included on the Rich List conditional on observable 
                                                        
10
 Although the DID-PSM approach allows us to purge all time-invariant unobserved factors, this 
approach still has a potential problem of time-varying unobserved factors that may be correlated with 
being listed and the outcomes of interest. Unfortunately, we cannot completely rule out this possibility. 
11
 As the Hurun Rich List is published in October or November every year, we exclude the listing year 
to make our sample cleaner. However, the results are qualitatively similar if we re-define the 
POST-Listed period as the listing and subsequent two years. 
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features (See the Appendix for more details). To maintain the statistical independence of 
our tests, we employ a nearest neighbor matching algorithm without replacement (i.e., 
allow a matching company to be used only once). Once a matching company is selected for 
the control sample, it is removed from the matching pool, and we implement the matching 
procedure by listing year (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Armstrong et al., 2010). Once we 
obtain propensity score matches, we then look three years forward and back to construct 
pseudo PRE-Listed and POST-Listed periods for each control company. Although control 
sample have no true “listing year” like our treatment sample, this process yields a control 
sample with PRE-Listed and POST-Listed periods that have the same dispersion in 
calendar time to the periods that comprise our treatment sample. Finally, our treatment 
sample consists of 553 firm-year observations, including 263 observations for the 
PRE-Listed period, and 290 observations for the POST-period, and the control sample is 
constructed in the same way. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the treatment and control samples. We report 
both a parametric t-test of the difference in means and a Wilcoxon test of the difference 
between the two samples. The p-values indicate that both the means and medians of 
Leverage, Loss, and Issue between the two samples are not significant. While the means 
and medians of Size and CtrlRight are statistically different, the economic differences 
between the treatment and control samples are very small. 
****************** 
Insert Table 3 here 
****************** 
 
4.3 Long-term Market Performance 
In addition to the short-term market reaction, we explore the effects of being included 
on the Rich List has on the long-term value of affiliated companies by employing the 
following basic model:  
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     
    
     
 (2) 
Following Doidge et al. (2004), we compute Tobin’s Q as [(Total Assets – Book Equity) 
+ Market Value of Equity] / Total Assets, which is used to measure firm value. Fortune is 
an indicator variable set to one if the firm belongs to the treatment sample, and zero if it 
belongs to the control sample. Listed is an indicator variable that equals one for the 
“POST-Listed” period (years T+1, T+2, and T+3), and zero for the “PRE-Listed” period 
(years T-1, T-2, and T-3). Size is the natural logarithm of the company’s total assets at the 
end of the fiscal year. Leverage is the debt ratio, which is defined as the ratio of total debt 
divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Growth is the firm’s two-year sales 
growth rate, which is defined as the geometric mean of sales growth in the previous two 
years. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income scaled by total assets at the end of 
the fiscal year. CtrlRight is the ownership rights owned by the controlling shareholders. In 
addition, we also include year and industry dummies to control for time and 
industry-specific factors. 
Table 4 presents the results for the effects of the Rich List on the long-term market 
performance. Specifically, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of Tobin’s Q including 
PRE-Listed and POST-Listed period comparisons. The mean of Tobin’s Q is significantly 
lower in the POST-Listed period than in the PRE-Listed period for the treatment sample 
(with a p-value of <0.0001), while it is insignificant for the control sample (with a p-value 
of 0.4393). The tests in Panel A provide preliminary support that firm value decreases after 
being listed on the Rich List. 
Panel B reports the regression results. Following our specification in Model (2), we 
find that the coefficient on the Fortune×Listed is significantly negative no matter whether 
we include the control variables or not (with coefficients of -0.5635 and -0.3365, 
respectively, and t-statistics of -3.70 and -2.67, respectively), suggesting that the 
detrimental effect of the Rich List on the value of affiliated companies is long-term and 
permanent. Most of the signs on the coefficients on the control variables are either 
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consistent with our predictions or are insignificant. Overall, our findings are consistent with 
the view that the egalitarian social norms of the Chinese people have an impact on how 
they view great personal wealth of business people and how this is translated to stock 
market values of the firms controlled by these entrepreneurs. 
****************** 
Insert Table 4 here 
****************** 
 
4.4 Government Subsidy 
Government subsidies are a direct and convenient way for the government to assist 
firms. The accounting standard “Accounting System for Business Enterprises”, released by 
the Ministry of Finance in 2001, defines a subsidy as the actual revenue from a subsidy 
received from the government, such as value-added tax rebates, periodic quota subsidies 
calculated based on sales, and other types of state financial support. Subsidies are listed 
before the pre-tax profits in a firm’s profit and loss (income) statement. Under the influence 
of China’s egalitarian culture and public pressure, the government is less likely to help the 
companies controlled by the listed entrepreneurs. We use the following Model (3) to test the 
hypothesis that firms receive less government subsidies after their ultimate controllers are 
listed on the Rich List: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , ,( )
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
Subsidy Fortune Listed Fortune Listed
Size Leverage Growth ROA CtrlRight
Loss Issue FisDef Lag Subsidy
   
    
    
    
    
    
      (3) 
Subsidy measures government assistance to a company, defined as the subsidy 
received from the government scaled by total sales (×100). Similar to Model (2), we control 
for firm size, leverage, sales growth, profitability, and controlling shareholders’ ownership 
in the model. These variables are defined as before. Moreover, Chen et al. (2008) find that 
local governments provide subsidies to help firms boost their earnings above the regulatory 
threshold for rights offerings and delisting. Therefore, we also add two dummy variables, 
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Loss and Issue, to the basic model to control for these two earnings management 
motivations. Loss is a dummy variable, which equals one if a firm’s ROE is in the range of 
[0, 1%], and zero otherwise. The regulatory body uses bright-line rules to screen firms for 
initial public offerings, rights offerings, seasoned equity offerings, and delisting, which 
creates an incentive for earnings management (Aharony et al., 2000; Chen and Yuan, 2004). 
Issue equals one when a firm’s ROE just qualifies it for a rights issue (10-11% for 
1996-1998; 6-7% or 10-11% for 1999-2000; 6-7% for 2001; 6-7% or 10-11% for 
2002-2005; 6-7% afterwards), and zero otherwise.
12
 FisDef is defined as the per capita 
fiscal deficit in the region, which controls for the budget tightness of the local government, 
as the wealthier local governments tend to be more generous (Chen et al., 2008). 
Lag(Subsidy) is the lag of government subsidy. In addition, we also include year and 
industry dummies to control for time and industry-specific factors. 
Table 5 presents the results for the effects of the Rich List on the government subsidy. 
Specifically, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of Subsidy including PRE-Listed and 
POST-Listed period comparisons. The mean of Subsidy that firms receive from the 
                                                        
12
 On January 24, 1996, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued a guideline 
[1996, no.17] requiring rights offerings companies to satisfy the following criteria: “a firm is required to 
achieve a minimum return on equity (ROE) of 10% in each of the previous three fiscal years”. On March 
17, 1999, the CSRC issued a guideline [1999, no.12] requiring rights offerings companies to satisfy the 
following criteria: “a firm is required to achieve a threshold of a three-year average ROE of 10%, and a 
minimum ROE of 6% in each of the previous three fiscal years”. On March 28, 2001, the CSRC issued a 
guideline [2001, no.43] requiring rights offerings companies to satisfy the following criteria: “a firm is 
required to achieve a threshold of a three-year average weighted ROE of 6% in the previous three fiscal 
years, and the current year weighted ROE of 6% after the issuance”. On July 24, 2002, the CSRC issued 
a guideline [2002, no.55] requiring seasoned equity offerings companies to satisfy the following criteria: 
“a firm is required to achieve a threshold of a three-year average ROE of 10% in the previous three fiscal 
years, and a minimum ROE of 10% in the latest fiscal year”. On April 26, 2006, the CSRC issued a 
further guideline [2006, no.30] requiring seasoned equity offerings companies to satisfy the following 
criteria: “a firm is required to achieve a threshold of a three-year average weighted ROE of 6% in the 
previous three fiscal years”. 
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government is significantly lower in the POST-Listed period than in the PRE-Listed period 
for the treatment sample (with a p-value of 0.0757), while it is increases slightly 
(insignificant) for the control sample. Panel B reports the regression results. In column (1), 
we estimate Model (3) without control variables and the results show that the coefficient on 
the Fortune×Listed is significantly negative (with a coefficient of -0.3787 and a t-statistic 
of -2.14). In column (2), we re-estimate Model (3) including the control variables and find 
that the coefficient on Fortune×Listed is still significantly negative (with a coefficient of 
-0.3275 and a t-statistic of -2.12). Overall, our results indicate that firms receive less 
government subsidies after their ultimate controlling shareholders are listed on the Rich List, 
even after controlling for the other relevant factors. 
****************** 
Insert Table 5 here 
****************** 
 
4.5 Legal Risk 
As discussed earlier, as a result of the influence of the egalitarian culture and public 
pressure, the government may monitor billionaires on the Rich List more closely. To test 
this hypothesis, we first hand collect the data on whether the entrepreneurs of private firms 
are investigated, arrested or charged during the period from 1999 to 2012, by searching the 
following keywords “name of the entrepreneur plus arrested”, “name of the entrepreneur 
plus detention”, “name of the entrepreneur plus investigation” and “name of the 
entrepreneur plus penalty” from “www.google.com” and “www.baidu.com”.13 Then, we 
conduct an entrepreneur-level test employing the following Model (4) to examine whether 
entrepreneurs are more likely to be investigated, arrested or charged after being included on 
                                                        
13
 Baidu is a Chinese search engine for websites, audio files, and images. It is called “Google in China”. 
Baidu offers 57 search and community services. In April 2010, Baidu ranked 7th overall in Alexa’s 
internet rankings. In December 2007, Baidu became the first Chinese company to be included in the 
NASDAQ-100 index. Baidu provides an index of over 740 million web pages, 80 million images, and 10 
million multimedia files. 
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the Rich List, compared to the control sample. There are no cases of an entrepreneur being 
under investigation before them being included on the rich list (whereas there are cases of 
entrepreneurs in the control sample being under investigation). Therefore, it will bias for 
our results if we conduct a difference-in-difference analysis for litigation. To avoid this 
problem, we compare the probability of litigation between the entrepreneur on the Rich List 
and the entrepreneur of other private firms (control sample) for the one-year, three-years 
and five-years subsequent to the listing year.
14
 Thus the data are at the firm level rather 
than at the firm-year level. Our model is: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , ,
( 1)i t j i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
Prob Litigation Fortune Size Leverage
Growth ROA CtrlRight
   
   
     
   
            (4) 
Where Litigationi,t+j is a dummy variable, which equals one if the entrepreneur i is 
investigated, arrested or charged over the next j years after being included on the Rich List 
(j=1, 3, 5, respectively), and zero otherwise. Fortune is an indicator variable set to one if 
the firm belongs to the treatment sample, and zero if it is belong to the control sample. All 
other variables are as previously defined, and independent variables are measured in the 
listing year (the T year). We expect the treatment sample will suffer higher legal risk. 
Accordingly, we expect β1 to be positive for treatment sample. 
Table 6 presents the results for the effects of the Rich List on the entrepreneurs’ legal 
risk. Specifically, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of entrepreneur-level litigations 
for the one-year, three-years, and five-years subsequent to the listing year, respectively. We 
find that the cumulative probability of the treatment sample to be investigated, arrested, or 
charged over the next one-year, three-years, and five-years are 2.06%, 19.59%, and 24.74%, 
respectively, while the probabilities of the control sample to be investigated are 1.03%, 
2.06%, 5.15%, respectively. The parametric difference of means t-test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the two groups have the same means for the post three-years and five-years 
(with p-values of 0.0001). Panel B reports the Logit regression results. We find that the 
                                                        
14
 The results are even more stronger if we using difference-in-difference analysis for this test. 
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coefficients on Fortune are significantly positive across three post periods (with 
coefficients of 1.84, 3.68, and 2.62, respectively, and z-statistics of 2.24, 2.67, and 3.44, 
respectively). The findings suggest that entrepreneurs are more likely to be investigated, 
arrested or charged after being included on the Rich List compared to the control sample. 
****************** 
Insert Table 6 here 
****************** 
 
4.6 Earnings Management 
In regard to the entrepreneurs’ responses to being included on the Rich List, we explore 
whether they conceal profits through negative earnings management after being listed. 
Following Kothari et al. (2005), we use a performance-matched modified cross-sectional 
Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals and thus to measure the extent of earnings 
management. 
0 1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
( Re )1
 
   
   
  
      it it it it it
i t i t i t i t
TA v AR PPE
Asset Asset Asset Asset
             (5) 
TAit represents the total accruals, defined as the difference between net income and net 
operating cash flow. Assett-1 is total assets at the end of year, Revit is the change in 
revenue from the preceding year, ARit is the change in accounts receivable from the 
preceding year, and PPEit is the net value of property, plant and equipment. For each year, 
we estimate Model (5) for every industry classified by the CSRC code, and use the 
residuals from the regression as the Modified-Jones model discretionary accruals (DA). 
Then, we match each firm-year observation with all other firms in the same industry, and 
year, and with the closest ROA. We define the discretionary accruals for firm i in year t as 
the discretionary accrual minus the discretionary accrual of the matched firm sample. 
Next, we employ the following Model (6) to examine whether firms conceal earnings 
through negative earnings management after the listing: 
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EM Fortune Listed Fortune Listed
Size Leverage Growth ROA CtrlRight
Loss Issue
   
    
  
    
    
  
        (6) 
In the above model, EM measures the extent of earnings management, which is 
defined as the Modified-Jones model performance matched discretionary accruals (Kothari 
et al., 2005). All other variables are as previous defined. We also include year and industry 
dummies to control for time and industry-specific factors. 
Table 7 presents the results for the effects of the Rich List on the earnings management. 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of EM including PRE-Listed and POST-Listed 
period comparisons
15
. The mean of EM is significantly lower in the POST-Listed period 
than in the PRE-Listed period for the treatment sample (with a p-value of 0.0163), while it 
is insignificant for the control sample. Moreover, the mean of EM in the POST-Listed 
period are negative. The preliminary evidence supports the argument that the affiliated 
companies tend to engage in negative earnings management after their controlling 
shareholders are listed on the Rich List.  
Panel B reports the regression results. We find that the coefficients on the 
Fortune×Listed are significantly negative in columns (1) and (2) (with coefficients of 
-0.0314 and -0.0347, respectively, and t-statistics of -2.10 and -2.32, respectively), 
suggesting that the wealthy entrepreneurs on the Rich List tend to conceal their wealth 
through negative earnings management to reduce the scrutiny from the public and the 
media. Consistent with the studies of Chen and Yuan (2004) and Liu and Lu (2007), we 
find that the coefficient on Issue is significantly negative, suggesting that the listed firms 
have strong incentives to manage earnings upward to meet the regulatory requirements. 
                                                        
15
 The main reason for the decrease in the PRE-Listed period sample is that the Chinese listed 
companies only began to disclose cash flow statements since 1998, and these statements are needed to 
estimate discretionary accruals. Therefore, we start the sample in 1998 for the earnings management tests. 
For other Difference-in-Difference tests, the first year of PRE-Listed period is 1996, as the first event 
year is 1999. 
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****************** 
Insert Table 7 here 
****************** 
 
4.7 The Effect of Fairness 
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) show that people tolerate inequality that derives from 
innate ability and effort, but are averse to inequality arising from connections or corruption. 
We test whether investors are more resentful towards wealthy entrepreneurs who enter into 
rent-seeking industries. In China, entrepreneurs usually need to build political connections 
or bribe government officials to enter into highly regulated industries where they can gain 
exorbitant profits (Hu and Shi, 2008; Luo and Liu, 2009). We divide the sample into two 
groups: firms involved in the mining, public utilities, financial, or real estate industries (the 
rent-seeking industries), and those which are not. Panel A of Table 8 shows that the mean 
CARs for firms that are in rent-seeking industries are significantly negative for the 
windows (-1, 1), (-2, 2), and (-10, 10) (the mean values are -1.244%, -1.553%, and -3.432%, 
respectively), while the CARs are not significant for firms that are not in rent-seeking 
industries. See Figure 2-1. We also report the Schipper and Thompson (1983) regression 
results. We find a significantly negative event-day effect for the firms in rent-seeking 
industries. The finding is consistent with our conjecture that people are concerned about 
whether an entrepreneur’s great wealth is derived from innate abilities or whether it is 
derived from political connections and-or bribery. People might be impressed by the former 
but are disgusted with the latter.  
To test firms’ long-term market performance after their controlling shareholders have 
been included on the Rich List and how the government reacts towards the listing, we redo 
regression Models (2) and (3) by partitioning the sample based on whether or not a firm is 
in a rent-seeking industry. Table 8, Panel B, columns (1) and (2) present the results of 
Model (2) for firms’ long-term market performance. We find the coefficient on Listed for 
the rent-seeking sample is -0.44, and is statistically significant (t-stat. = -2.36), while that 
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for the non-rent-seeking sample is -0.24, but is not significant (t-stat. = -1.43). This implies 
that the long-term detrimental impact of inclusion on the Rich List is more pronounced for 
the affiliated firms in rent-seeking industries. Similarly, Table 8, Panel C, columns (1) and 
(2), report the results of Model (3) for the government subsidies. We find that the 
coefficient on Fortune×Listed is significantly negative for rent-seeking firms (coeff. = 
-0.71, t-stat. = -2.98), while that for the non-rent-seeking firms is not significant (coeff. = 
0.17, t-stat. = 0.83). This indicates that the government tends to grant fewer subsidies to 
rent-seeking firms after their controlling shareholders are included on the Rich List. Table 8, 
Panel D, columns (1) and (2) report the results of Model (6) for earnings management. We 
find that the coefficient on Fortune×Listed is significantly negative for rent-seeking firms 
(coeff. = -0.045, t-stat. = -2.29), while that for non-rent-seeking firms is not significant 
(coeff. = -0.025, t-stat. = -1.08). This indicates that wealthy entrepreneurs from a 
rent-seeking industry tend to conceal their wealth through negative earnings management to 
reduce the scrutiny from the public and the media. 
Overall, these results are consistent with people having negative views towards those 
on the Rich List, as they feel many of the wealthy have used guanxi or official connections 
to enhance their wealth. Moreover, the government stops offering its helping hand to firms 
after their controlling shareholders are included on the list. This implies that people 
consider inequality originating in corruption and rent seeking more unfair than inequality 
originating from productive effort and market competition. 
****************** 
Insert Table 8 here 
****************** 
 
4.8 Strategic Philanthropy 
In order to remedy the negative image of appearing on the Rich List, wealthy 
entrepreneurs can engage in strategic philanthropy. Charitable contributions can raise a 
company’s reputation and image, enhance customer loyalty, and lead to more lenient 
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treatment by regulators or government officials. A firm’s investments in philanthropy can 
help to maintain valuable goodwill that offsets or ameliorates negative publicity (Barnett 
and Salomon, 2006). This is especially likely for the Rich List entrepreneurs in an 
environment of resentment against the rich. The Hurun Rich List also publishes a list of 
China’s leading philanthropists each year. We partition the full sample based on whether the 
entrepreneurs are also included on the Philanthropist List. Specifically, we identify firms 
with entrepreneurs listed on the Philanthropist List as the “High Donation” group, 
otherwise they are classified as the “Low Donation” group. We therefore reexamine the 
investors and government reactions to an entrepreneur’s inclusion on the Rich List. Panel A 
of Table 9 shows that the CAR for window [-10, 10] for the firms affiliated with the high 
and low donation groups are -0.44% and -2.23%, respectively. See Figure 2-2. The 
Schipper and Thompson (1983) results provide similar conclusions. These findings imply 
that public donations can enhance a firm’s reputation and public image, leading to more 
favorable treatment from the market. To obtain further evidence on the mitigating effect of 
philanthropy, we conduct analyses of long-term market performance by partitioning the 
sample based on charitable donations. Panel B of Table 9 presents the results. We find the 
coefficient on Fortune×Listed for the low-donation sample is -0.436, and is statistically 
significant (t-stat. = -3.01), while that for the high-donation sample is -0.069, but is not 
significant (t-stat. = -0.26). This implies that the long-term detrimental impact of inclusion 
on the Rich List is more pronounced for the affiliated firms with low donations. Table 9, 
Panel C, reports the results of Model (3) for the government subsidies. We find that the 
coefficient on Fortune×Listed is significantly negative for low-donation firms (coeff. = 
-0.48, t-stat. = -2.53), while that for high donation firms is not significant (coeff. = 0.14, 
t-stat. = 0.66). This indicates that the government tends to grant fewer subsidies to 
low-donation firms after their controlling shareholders are included on the Rich List. Table 
9, Panel D reports the results of Model (6) for earnings management. We find that the 
coefficient on Fortune×Listed is significantly negative for low-donation firms (coeff. = 
-0.038, t-stat. = -2.19), while that for high-donation firms is not significant (coeff. = -0.021, 
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t-stat. = -0.68). This indicates that wealthy entrepreneurs with low-donations try to conceal 
their wealth through negative earnings management in order to reduce scrutiny from the 
public and the media. In sum we find that the firms affiliated with wealthy business people 
who engage in strategic philanthropy to enhance their reputation and image, do not suffer 
reduced long term valuations, nor do they suffer reduced government subsidies and nor do 
they try to conceal their wealth via earnings management. Thus, investors and the 
government discriminate between the rich and miserly on the one hand and the rich and 
generous on the other. 
****************** 
Insert Table 9 here 
****************** 
 
5. Conclusion 
Chinese people are heavily influenced by China’s two thousand-year old Confucian 
ideology and the recent experience of living under socialist rules. Under these influences, 
the Chinese people have developed preferences for equality and a distaste for those with 
great wealth. This paper explores the reactions of investors and governments to the 
publication of the Rich List, which publicizes the names of the 100 richest business people 
each year, to study the impact of egalitarianism in China. We find that, when the Rich List 
is announced, investors react negatively to the companies controlled by the Rich List 
entrepreneurs. In addition, the market values of these companies drop significantly in the 
following three years, which indicates that investors perceive inclusion in the Rich List as a 
form of bad news. Second, under public pressure, the government tends to scrutinize the 
Rich List entrepreneurs and their affiliated companies more closely. We find that, after 
being included on the list, entrepreneurs are far more likely to be investigated, arrested and 
charged compared to other private entrepreneurs. Moreover, the listed entrepreneurs are 
more likely to conceal profits through negative earnings management after being listed. We 
also find that the firms controlled by Rich List entrepreneurs that are involved in 
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rent-seeking industries and have a poor or undistinguished public image tend to experience 
more negative consequences. This is consistent with the fairness concept that the rich who 
benefit from political connections or rent-seeking are treated differently than those who rely 
on their talent and innovation. We find that wealthy entrepreneurs can engage in strategic 
philanthropy to gain acceptance from stakeholders and government officials.  
Confucianism lauds humbleness and derides undeserving conspicuous wealth. In 
China, this translates to negative stock returns and unfavorable government actions on 
listed firms owned by very rich businessmen. These reactions are mitigated if a 
businessman’s wealth is credited to hard work and ingenuity rather than having political 
connections or corrupt behaviors. Similarly, the adverse reactions to being conspicuously 
rich are mitigated if an entrepreneur’s firm engages in significant philanthropy. As a 
consequence of Confucianism, rich Chinese businessmen tend to shun the spot light and 
this contrasts with the celebrity lifestyles and publicity-seeking behaviors of some Western 
billionaires. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Yearly Distribution 
Panel A: Sample Selection Process 
Companies listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China which are 
directly or indirectly controlled by the top 100 entrepreneurs on the Hurun Rich List 
from 1999 to 2009. If an individual appears on the Rich List in several years we simply 
use the first year they appear in the list.  
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-- Exclude companies with insufficient financial information on the Pre- and Post- 
Listed periods in the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database. 
(11) 
-- Exclude companies with insufficient or missing return data during the event period. (4) 
-- Exclude companies in the financial industry. (2) 
Final sample 97 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Num. of Firms 
(%) 
8 
(8.25%) 
8 
(8.25%) 
17 
(17.53%) 
7 
(7.22%) 
16 
(16.49%) 
10 
(10.31%) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Num. of Firms 
(%) 
12 
(12.37%) 
9 
(9.28%) 
5 
(5.15%) 
3 
(3.09%) 
2 
(2.06%) 
97 
(100.0%) 
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TABLE 2 
Market Reaction to the Announcement of the Rich List 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 days(-1, 1)  days(-2, 2)  days(-10, 10) 
Mean CAR -0.585%  -0.772%  -1.825% 
(t-stat.) (-1.74 )  (-1.77)  (-1.68) 
[p-value] [0.0854]  [0.0798]  [0.0960] 
Panel B: Schipper and Thompson (1983) Regressions: 
, , ,p t m t k k t tR R Event        
Dependent Variable: Rp 
days(-1, 1)  days(-2, 2)  days(-10, 10) 
Coeff./ (t-stat.)  Coeff./ (t-stat.)  Coeff./ (t-stat.) 
Constant 0.0003  0.0002  0.0004
**
 
 (1.55)  (1.50)  (2.38) 
Rm 0.9733
***
  0.9733
***
  0.9729
***
 
 (107.54)  (107.44)  (107.63) 
Event -0.0034
**
  -0.0017  -0.0022
***
 
 (-2.27)  (-1.45)  (-3.83) 
N 2,654  2,654  2,654 
Adj-R
2
 0.8136  0.8134  0.8143 
Panel C: Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns 
 BHAR-12  BHAR-24  BHAR-36 
Mean BHAR -7.92%  -15.36%  -18.53% 
(t-stat.) (-2.20)  (-2.03)  (-1.74) 
[p-value] [0.0303]  [0.0452]  [0.0846] 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the CARs around the announcement date of the Rich List for 
the windows (-1, 1), (-2, 2), and (-10, 10), respectively. We set the first day following the announcement 
of the Rich List as the event day, and calculate CARs using the market model with the value-weighted 
index as market return and the estimation period is 200 days before day -10. Firms must have returns for 
at least 90 of 200 trading days to be included in the sample. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses, 
and the p-values are reported in brackets. Panel B reports the Schipper and Thompson (1983) regression 
results for the firms that included in the Rich List. Observations are the daily portfolios of the treatment 
sample for the 2,654 trading days from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2009. Rp equals the daily return 
to an equally-weighted portfolio of the treatment sample. Rm equals the daily market return. Event equals 
one for the days (-1, 1), (-2, 2) and (-10, 10) around the date when the Rich List announced, and zero 
otherwise. The δk coefficient represents the “shift in mean excess return” associated with the event 
(Schipper and Thompson, 1983). The t-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Panel 
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C reports the buy-and-hold returns for 12 months, 24 months and 36 months. The buy-and-hold returns 
are estimated from the one month after the Rich List announcement. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics for the Treatment and Control Samples 
Variables 
(1) Treatment Sample  (2) Control Sample  t-test of diff. 
in mean 
[p-value] 
Wilcoxon test of 
diff. in median 
[p-value] N Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3  N Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3 
 
Listed 553 0.5244 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000  553 0.5244 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000  - - 
Tobin’s Q 553 2.5207 1.5411 1.4129 1.9612 3.1475  553 2.5994 1.5880 1.4527 2.1150 3.2076  [0.4030] [0.3296] 
Subsidy 553 0.6876 1.5989 0.0000 0.0436 0.4691  553 0.6176 1.3928 0.0000 0.0268 0.5238  [0.4376] [0.4456] 
EM 538 -0.0045 0.1229 -0.0793 -0.0023 0.0740  538 0.0025 0.1243 -0.0739 0.0065 0.0769  [0.3578] [0.2438] 
Size 553 21.013 0.8879 20.452 20.966 21.576  553 20.817 0.8616 20.196 20.763 21.423  [0.0002] [0.0004] 
Leverage 553 0.5082 0.2390 0.3632 0.5131 0.6452  553 0.5344 0.2930 0.3481 0.5013 0.6406  [0.1037] [0.9559] 
Growth 553 0.2264 0.4406 -0.0049 0.1725 0.4035  553 0.1535 0.4088 -0.0665 0.1065 0.2956  [0.0044] [0.0002] 
ROA 553 0.0197 0.0956 0.0104 0.0357 0.0666  553 0.0069 0.1001 0.0052 0.0301 0.0538  [0.0302] [0.0012] 
CtrlRight 553 0.3685 0.1538 0.2615 0.2990 0.4876  553 0.3410 0.1417 0.2325 0.2990 0.4433  [0.0020] [0.0119] 
Loss 553 0.0325 0.1776 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  553 0.0470 0.2119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  [0.2188] [0.2187] 
Issue 553 0.0958 0.2946 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  553 0.1121 0.3158 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  [0.3757] [0.3756] 
FisDef 553 6.3984 0.7434 5.9535 6.2820 6.8463  553 6.2935 0.7349 5.8738 6.2311 6.6841  [0.0185] [0.0090] 
The table provides descriptive statistics for the treatment and control samples. Listed is an indicator variable that equals one for the “Post-Listed” period (years T+1, 
T+2, and T+3), and zero for the “Pre-Listed” period (years T-1, T-2, and T-3). Tobin’s Q equals [(Total Assets – Book Equity) + Market Value of Equity] / Total 
Assets, which is used to measure firm value. Subsidy measures government assistance to a company, defined as the subsidy received from the government scaled by 
total sales (×100). EM measures the extent of earnings management, which is defined as the Modified-Jones model performance matched discretionary accruals. 
Size is the natural logarithm of a company’s total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Leverage is the debt ratio, which is defined as the ratio of total debt divided by 
total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Growth is a firm’s two-year sales growth rate, which is defined as the geometric mean of sales growth in the past two years. 
ROA is return on assets calculated as net income scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. CtrlRight is the ownership rights owned by the controlling 
shareholders. Loss is a dummy variable, which equals one if a firm’s ROE is in the range [0, 1%], and zero otherwise. Issue is a dummy variable, which equals one if 
a firm’s ROE just qualifies for a rights issue (10-11% for 1996-1998; 6-7% or 10-11% for 1999-2000; 6-7% for 2001; 6-7% or 10-11% for 2002-2005; 6-7% 
afterwards), and zero otherwise. FisDef is the fiscal deficit per capita in the region. 
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TABLE 4 
The Effects of the Rich List on the Long-term Market Performance 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Tobin’s Q 
Period 
(1) Treatment Sample  (2) Control Sample 
N Mean  N Mean 
Pre-Listed 263 2.8705  263 2.6537 
Post-Listed 290 2.2035  290 2.5502 
t-stat./p-values for : 
t-test of difference in mean 
(5.15) 
[<0.0001] 
  
(0.77) 
[0.4393] 
Panel B: Regression Results 
Dependent 
Variable: Tobin’s Q 
(1)  (2) 
Coeff. (t-stat.)  Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Constant 2.2371
***
 (5.43)  20.100
***
 (19.02) 
Fortune 0.2168
**
 (2.07)  0.2722
***
 (3.06) 
Listed 0.3360
***
 (2.83)  0.1889
**
 (2.14) 
Fortune×Listed -0.5635
***
 (-3.70)  -0.3365
***
 (-2.67) 
Size    -0.9062
***
 (-18.98) 
Leverage    1.2354
***
 (6.63) 
Growth    0.0143 (0.16) 
ROA    2.5442
***
 (5.02) 
CtrlRight    0.0565 (0.25) 
N 1,106  1,106 
Adj-R
2
 0.3381  0.5478 
The table presents the results on whether being listed on the Rich List has a negative effect on the 
long-term market performance of affiliated companies. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of 
Tobin’s Q. Panel B reports the regression results of using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. Fortune is 
an indicator variable set to one if the firm belongs to the treatment sample, and zero if it belongs to the 
control sample. Other variables are defined as in Table 3. For all regressions, we also control for industry 
and year dummies. The t-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
The Effects of the Rich List on the Government Subsidy 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Government Subsidy 
Period 
(1) Treatment Sample  (2) Control Sample 
N Mean  N Mean 
Pre-Listed 263 0.8179  263 0.5493 
Post-Listed 290 0.5695  290 0.6796 
t-stat./p-values for : 
t-test of difference in mean 
(1.78) 
[0.0757] 
  
(-1.12) 
[0.2641] 
Panel B: Regression Results 
Dependent 
Variable: Subsidy 
(1)  (2) 
Coeff. (t-stat.)  Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Constant 0.8019
*
 (1.70)  1.6320 (1.15) 
Fortune 0.2686
*
 (1.96)  0.2042
*
 (1.69) 
Listed 0.2296
*
 (1.74)  0.1829
*
 (1.67) 
Fortune×Listed -0.3787
**
 (-2.14)  -0.3275
**
 (-2.12) 
Size    -0.1268
**
 (-1.98) 
Leverage    0.3833 (1.15) 
Growth    -0.3181
***
 (-2.85) 
ROA    2.0462
***
 (2.80) 
CtrlRight    0.1499 (0.51) 
Loss    -0.0045 (-0.03) 
Issue    0.0734 (0.64) 
FisDef    0.2051
***
 (2.85) 
Lag(Subsidy)    0.3386
***
 (6.21) 
N 1,106  1,106 
Adj-R
2
 0.0514  0.2265 
The table presents the results on whether firms receive less government subsidy after their ultimate 
shareholders are listed on the Rich List. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of Subsidy. Panel B 
reports the regression results of using Subsidy as the dependent variable. Fortune is an indicator variable 
set to one if the firm belongs to the treatment sample, and zero if it belongs to the control sample. Other 
variables are defined as in Table 3. For all regressions, we also control for industry and year dummies. 
The t-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
The Effects of the Rich List on the Entrepreneurs’ Legal Risk 
Panel A: Percent of Entrepreneur-level Litigation 
Post-Listed Periods Treatment Sample Control Sample  
t-test of Difference in Mean 
(t-stat.) [p-value] 
Post 1-year 
2.06% 
( 2/97 ) 
1.03% 
( 1/97 ) 
 (0.58) [0.5631] 
Post 3-years 
19.59% 
( 19/97 ) 
2.06% 
( 2/97 ) 
 (4.07) [<0.0001] 
Post 5-years 
24.74% 
( 24/97 ) 
5.15% 
( 5/97 ) 
 (3.96) [0.0001] 
Panel B: Logit Regression Results 
Variables 
(1) Post 1-year  (2) Post 3-years  (3) Post 5-years 
Coeff. (z-stat.)  Coeff. (z-stat.)  Coeff. (z-stat.) 
Constant -23.918
***
 (-3.28)  -17.520
**
 (-2.31)  -10.207
*
 (-1.78) 
Fortune 1.8411
**
 (2.24)  3.6778
***
 (2.67)  2.6158
***
 (3.44) 
Size 0.6669 (1.57)  0.6151
*
 (1.72)  0.3538 (1.24) 
Leverage 2.8991
*
 (1.65)  1.2784 (1.08)  1.0995 (0.87) 
Growth 0.8259 (0.99)  -0.2432 (-0.32)  -0.3789 (-0.60) 
ROA -11.004
***
 (-2.64)  -7.8422
**
 (-2.44)  -6.3563
***
 (-2.61) 
CtrlRight 4.7296 (0.98)  -3.3236 (-1.55)  -4.0568
**
 (-2.08) 
N 194  194  194 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.2828  0.2963  0.2554 
Wald Chi
2
 37.12  17.46  27.74 
The table presents the results on whether listed entrepreneurs are more likely to be investigated, arrested 
or charged after being included on the Rich List. We hand collect the information on whether the 
entrepreneur is charged, investigated or arrested mainly through searching “name of the entrepreneur 
plus arrested”, “name of the entrepreneur plus detention”, “name of the entrepreneur plus investigation” 
and “name of the entrepreneur plus penalty” from “www.google.com” and “www.baidu.com”. Litigation 
is a dummy variable, which equals one if the entrepreneur is investigated, arrested or charged, and zero 
otherwise. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of entrepreneur-level litigations for the one-year, 
three-years and five-years subsequent to the listing year (the T year), respectively. Panel B reports the 
Logit regression results of using Litigation as the dependent variable. The independent variables are 
measured in the listing year. Fortune is an indicator variable set to one if the firm belongs to the 
treatment sample, and zero if it belongs to the control sample. Other variables are defined as in Table 3. 
The z-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
The Effects of the Rich List on Earnings Management 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Earnings Management 
Period 
(1) Treatment Sample  (2) Control Sample 
N Mean  N Mean 
Pre-Listed 248 0.0093  248 -0.0007 
Post-Listed 290 -0.0162  290 0.0052 
t-stat./p-values for : 
t-test of difference in mean 
(2.41) 
[0.0163] 
  
(-0.55) 
[0.5831] 
Panel B: Regression Results 
Dependent 
Variable: EM 
(1)  (2) 
Coeff. (t-stat.)  Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Constant 0.0267 (0.59)  -0.1286 (-1.02) 
Fortune 0.0100 (0.92)  0.0094 (0.87) 
Listed 0.0001 (0.01)  0.0048 (0.39) 
Fortune×Listed -0.0314
**
 (-2.10)  -0.0347
**
 (-2.32) 
Size    0.0078 (1.42) 
Leverage    -0.0342
*
 (-1.72) 
Growth    -0.0085 (-0.75) 
ROA    0.0098 (0.18) 
CtrlRight    0.0039 (0.14) 
Loss    -0.0025 (-0.13) 
Issue    -0.0335
***
 (-2.83) 
N 1,076  1,076 
Adj-R
2
 0.0515  0.0648 
The table presents the results on whether firms controlled by listed entrepreneurs conceal earnings 
through earnings management after being listed on the Rich List. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics 
of EM. Panel B reports the regression results of using EM as the dependent variable. Fortune is an 
indicator variable set to one if the firm belongs to the treatment sample, and zero if it belongs to the 
control sample. Other variables are defined as in Table 3. For all regressions, we also control for industry 
and year dummies. The t-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
The Effects of Rent Seeking on the Economic Consequences of Inclusion on the Rich List 
Panel A: The effects of rent seeking on the market reaction towards inclusion on the Rich List  
Descriptive Statistics of the CARs : 
 (1) Non-Rent-Seeking (N=50)  (2) Rent-Seeking (N=47) 
 days(-1,1) days(-2,2) days(-10,10)  days(-1,1) days(-2,2) days(-10,10) 
Mean CAR 0.035% -0.038% -0.032%  -1.244% -1.553% -3.432% 
(t-stat.) (0.08) (-0.08) (-0.23)  (-2.56) (-2.09) (-2.06) 
[p-value] [0.9380] [0.9355] [0.8221]  [0.0139] [0.0418] [0.0446] 
Schipper and Thompson (1983) Regressions : 
 days(-1,1) days(-2,2) days(-10,10)  days(-1,1) days(-2,2) days(-10,10) 
Constant 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004**  0.0003 0.0003 0.0004** 
 (1.55) (1.22) (2.06)  (1.55) (1.53) (2.12) 
Rm 0.9732
*** 0.9733*** 0.9728***  0.9713*** 0.9711*** 0.9710*** 
 (102.17) (102.08) (102.26)  (89.58) (89.49) (89.61) 
Event -0.0025 -0.0010 -0.0003  -0.0043** -0.0025* -0.0041*** 
 (-1.56) (-0.85) (-0.36)  (-2.43) (-1.83) (-3.04) 
N 2,654 2,654 2,654  2,654 2,654 2,654 
Adj-R2 0.7976 0.7973 0.7981  0.7519 0.7517 0.7522 
Panel B: The effects of rent seeking on the long-term performance towards inclusion on the Rich List 
Dependent Variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
(1) Non-Rent-Seeking  (2) Rent-Seeking 
Coeff. (t-stat.)  Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Constant 21.857*** (14.27)  18.130*** (13.23) 
Fortune 0.3066** (2.35)  0.2448** (1.99) 
Listed 0.1771 (1.49)  0.3245
**
 (2.26) 
Fortune×Listed -0.2394 (-1.43)  -0.4386
**
 (-2.36) 
Size -0.9951*** (-13.91)  -0.7855*** (-12.24) 
Leverage 1.2349*** (4.43)  1.1615*** (4.46) 
Growth 0.0981 (0.83)  -0.0856 (-0.68) 
ROA 2.3539*** (3.29)  2.5642*** (3.44) 
CtrlRight 0.9867*** (2.84)  -0.5225* (-1.75) 
N 562  544 
Adj-R2 0.5562  0.5644 
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Panel C: The effects of rent seeking on the government’s reaction towards inclusion on the Rich List 
Dependent Variable: 
Subsidy 
(1) Non-Rent-Seeking  (2) Rent-Seeking 
Coeff. (t-stat.)  Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Constant 4.0155* (1.87)  -0.7356 (-0.36) 
Fortune -0.2075 (-1.37)  0.5421*** (2.72) 
Listed -0.0416 (-0.27)  0.2969* (1.90) 
Fortune×Listed 0.1712 (0.83)  -0.7075
***
 (-2.98) 
Size -0.1867* (-1.92)  -0.0915 (-1.11) 
Leverage 1.0525* (1.74)  -0.0514 (-0.16) 
Growth -0.2182 (-1.46)  -0.3948** (-2.35) 
ROA 2.7592** (2.50)  1.4042 (1.51) 
CtrlRight 0.2006 (0.46)  0.1922 (0.46) 
Loss -0.0027 (-0.01)  -0.0639 (-0.26) 
Issue 0.0839 (0.50)  -0.0239 (-0.15) 
FisDef -0.0671 (-0.66)  0.3766*** (3.04) 
Lag(Subsidy) 0.2286*** (3.32)  0.3830*** (4.93) 
N 562  544 
Adj-R2 0.1257  0.3313 
Panel D: The effects of rent seeking on the entrepreneurs’ reactions towards inclusion on the Rich List 
Dependent Variable: 
EM 
(1) Non-Rent-Seeking  (2) Rent-Seeking 
Coeff. (t-stat.)  Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Constant -0.0473 (-0.23)  -0.4184** (-2.36) 
Fortune 0.0105 (0.64)  0.0075 (0.53) 
Listed 0.0031 (0.15)  0.0079 (0.49) 
Fortune×Listed -0.0250 (-1.08)  -0.0452
**
 (-2.29) 
Size 0.0054 (0.68)  0.0113 (1.48) 
Leverage -0.0032 (-0.11)  -0.0731*** (-2.66) 
Growth -0.0091 (-0.61)  -0.0070 (-0.40) 
ROA 0.0883 (1.08)  -0.0685 (-0.93) 
CtrlRight 0.0047 (0.11)  0.0087 (0.25) 
Loss -0.0115 (-0.33)  0.0013 (0.05) 
Issue -0.0253 (-1.27)  -0.0456*** (-3.07) 
N 538  538 
Adj-R
2
 0.0731  0.1094 
The table presents the results of the effect of rent seeking on the economic consequences of inclusion on 
the Rich List. We partition the full sample based on whether the entrepreneurs are involved in 
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rent-seeking industries, and redo the analyses similar to Tables 2, 4, 5, and 7 for the sub-samples. 
Specifically, we classify firms involved in mining, public utilities, financial, or real estate industry as the 
“Rent-Seeking” group, otherwise we classify them as the “Non-Rent-Seeking” group. Panel A, B, C, and 
D report results for the effect of rent seeking on the market reaction, long-term market performance, 
government’s reaction, and entrepreneurs’ reactions towards inclusion on the Rich List, respectively. 
Fortune is an indicator variable set to one if the firm belongs to the treatment sample, and zero if it 
belongs to the control sample. Other variables are defined as in Tables 2 and 3. For all regressions except 
Panel A, we also control for industry and year dummies. The p-values are reported in brackets, and the 
t-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
The Effects of Charitable Donations on the Economic Consequences of Inclusion on the Rich List 
Panel A: The effects of charitable donations on the market reaction towards inclusion on the Rich List 
Descriptive Statistics of the CARs : 
 (1) High Donation (N=22)  (2) Low Donation (N=75) 
 days(-1,1) days(-2,2) days(-10,10)  days(-1,1) days(-2,2) days(-10,10) 
Mean CAR -0.306% -0.097% -0.440%  -0.666% -0.970% -2.232% 
(t-stat.) (-0.41) (-0.11) (-0.18)  (-1.76) (-1.95) (-1.84) 
[p-value] [0.6867] [0.9158] [0.8577]  [0.0820] [0.0553] [0.0705] 
Schipper and Thompson (1983) Regressions : 
 days(-1,1) days(-2,2) days(-10,10)  days(-1,1) days(-2,2) days(-10,10) 
Constant 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005**  0.0002 0.0002 0.0004** 
 (1.82) (1.82) (2.45)  (1.36) (1.29) (2.18) 
Rm 0.9553
*** 0.9551*** 0.9549***  0.9778*** 0.9778*** 0.9774*** 
 (90.56) (90.48) (90.61)  (103.28) (103.19) (103.41) 
Event -0.0031** -0.0014 -0.0002  -0.0036** -0.0022* -0.0042*** 
 (-2.00) (-1.12) (-0.14)  (-2.09) (-1.68) (-3.67) 
N 2,654 2,654 2,654  2,654 2,654 2,654 
Adj-R2 0.7559 0.7557 0.7564  0.8010 0.8008 0.8017 
Panel B: The effects of charitable donations on the long-term performance towards inclusion on the 
Rich List 
Dependent Variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
(1) High Donation  (2) Low Donation 
Coeff. (t-stat.)  Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Constant 26.044*** (11.96)  18.994*** (15.26) 
Fortune 0.2839 (1.32)  0.3196*** (3.15) 
Listed 0.2444 (1.35)  0.2233
**
 (2.11) 
Fortune×Listed -0.0685 (-0.26)  -0.4359
***
 (-3.01) 
Size -1.0611*** (-10.39)  -0.8479*** (-14.95) 
Leverage 0.4283 (1.03)  1.3618*** (6.62) 
Growth 0.1412 (0.74)  0.0254 (0.26) 
ROA 1.5993 (1.05)  2.5484*** (4.72) 
CtrlRight 0.6642 (1.34)  -0.2928 (-1.07) 
N 252  854 
Adj-R2 0.5755  0.5457 
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Panel C: The effects of charitable donations on the government’s reaction towards inclusion on the 
Rich List 
Dependent Variable: 
Subsidy 
(1) High Donation  (2) Low Donation 
Coeff. (t-stat.)  Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Constant 3.3508 (1.45)  0.2494 (0.15) 
Fortune -0.1196 (-0.91)  0.3216** (2.11) 
Listed 0.1231 (0.73)  0.2709* (1.86) 
Fortune×Listed 0.1431 (0.66)  -0.4803
**
 (-2.53) 
Size -0.1890* (-1.66)  -0.0726 (-0.97) 
Leverage -0.0713 (-0.19)  0.4979 (1.34) 
Growth 0.0421 (0.26)  -0.4157*** (-2.88) 
ROA -0.2358 (-0.30)  2.4241*** (2.80) 
CtrlRight 0.3778 (1.16)  0.2022 (0.50) 
Loss 0.2539 (1.08)  -0.0846 (-0.46) 
Issue 0.3701 (1.63)  0.0005 (0.00) 
FisDef 0.0913 (1.24)  0.2351** (2.20) 
Lag(Subsidy) 0.1717* (1.75)  0.3463*** (5.94) 
N 252  854 
Adj-R2 0.1762  0.2354 
Panel D: The effects of charitable donations on the entrepreneurs’ reactions towards inclusion on the 
Rich List 
Dependent Variable: 
EM 
(1) High Donation  (2) Low Donation 
Coeff. (t-stat.)  Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Constant -0.5187* (-1.79)  -0.1006 (-0.65) 
Fortune -0.0095 (-0.46)  0.0154 (1.18) 
Listed -0.0041 (-0.18)  0.0091 (0.60) 
Fortune×Listed -0.0209 (-0.68)  -0.0382
**
 (-2.19) 
Size 0.0129 (0.99)  0.0065 (1.00) 
Leverage -0.0673 (-1.37)  -0.0323 (-1.44) 
Growth 0.0338 (1.26)  -0.0210 (-1.63) 
ROA -0.1677 (-1.22)  0.0393 (0.65) 
CtrlRight 0.0489 (1.00)  -0.0047 (-0.13) 
Loss -0.0669 (-1.47)  0.0179 (0.88) 
Issue -0.0364* (-1.74)  -0.0291** (-2.08) 
N 246  830 
Adj-R2 0.1544  0.0725 
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The table presents the results of the effect of charitable donations on the economic consequences of 
inclusion on the Rich List. We partition the full sample based on whether the entrepreneurs are also 
included on the Philanthropist List, and redo the analyses similar to Tables 2, 4, 5 and 7 for the 
sub-samples. Specifically, we identify firms with entrepreneurs listed on the Philanthropist List as the 
“High Donation” group, otherwise we classify them as the “Low Donation” group. Panels A, B, C and D 
report results for the effect of charitable donations on the market reaction, long-term market performance, 
government’s reaction, and entrepreneurs’ reactions towards inclusion on the Rich List, respectively. 
Fortune is an indicator variable set to one if the firm belongs to the treatment sample, and zero if it 
belongs to the control sample. Other variables are defined as in Tables 2 and 3. For all regressions except 
Panel A, we also control for industry and year dummies. The p-values are reported in brackets, and the 
t-statistics using Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 45 
 
Figure 1: Market Reaction to the Announcement of Rich List
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Figure 1 illustrates the CARs of the sample during the event window [-10, 10 days]. We set the first day 
following the announcement of the Rich List as the event date (day 0) and calculate CARs using the 
market model with the value-weighted index as market return and the estimation period is 200 days 
before day -10. 
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Figure 2-1: The Effects of Rent Seeking on the Market Reaction to the Rich List
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Figure 2-2: The Effects of Charitable Donations on the Market Reaction to the Rich List
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Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 illustrate the effects of rent seeking and charitable donations on the market 
reaction to the announcement of the Rich List, respectively. For Figure 2-1, we partition the full sample 
into “Rent-Seeking” and “Non-Rent-Seeking” groups based on whether the entrepreneurs are involved in 
rent-seeking industries. Specifically, we classify firms involved in the mining, public utilities, financial, 
or real estate industries as the “Rent-Seeking” group, otherwise we classify them as the 
“Non-Rent-Seeking” group. For Figure 2-2, we partition the full sample into “High Donation” and “Low 
Donation” groups based on whether the entrepreneurs are also included on the Philanthropist List. 
Specifically, we identify firms with entrepreneurs listed on the Philanthropist List as the “High 
Donation” group, otherwise we classify them as the “Low Donation” group. 
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Appendix: 
Propensity Score Matching 
Panel A: Propensity Score Estimation Using Logit Regression: 
0 1 2 3 4 5( 1)Prob Fortune Size Leverage Growth ROA CtrlRight               
Dependent Variable:  
Fortune 
Coeff. (z-stat.) 
Constant -13.444
***
 (-4.33) 
Size 0.46926
***
 (3.05) 
Leverage 0.0185 (0.03) 
Growth 0.1189 (0.39) 
ROA 1.1474 (0.54) 
CtrlRight 1.3575
**
 (2.00) 
N 3,733 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.0681 
Wald-Chi
2
 61.30 
Panel B: Comparison between Treatment and Control Samples 
 
Treatment Sample 
(N=97) 
 
Control Sample 
(N=97) 
 
t-test of diff. 
in mean 
[p-value] 
Wilcoxon test of 
diff. in median 
[p-value] Mean Median  Mean Median  
Size 20.852 20.888  20.760 20.782  [0.3950] [0.2909] 
Leverage 0.4769 0.4951  0.4710 0.4877  [0.8293] [0.7932] 
Growth 0.2157 0.1561  0.1802 0.1020  [0.5484] [0.3923] 
ROA 0.0285 0.0432  0.0206 0.0325  [0.4591] [0.1456] 
CtrlRight 0.3851 0.3329  0.3654 0.3361  [0.3818] [0.5948] 
Score 0.0298 0.0265  0.0276 0.0250  [0.1581] [0.3248] 
The table presents the results of propensity score estimation using logit regression. Score is the predicted 
likelihood that a company’s ultimate shareholder will be included on the Rich List conditional on 
observable features. Other variables are defined as in Table 3. The p-values are reported in brackets, and 
the z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
 
